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Abstract
We present a deterministic Key Predistribution scheme
in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) using combinatorial
designs. The design finds application where a large num-
ber sensor nodes are to be deployed. This scheme has the
advantage that each sensor node contains very few keys,
however every pair of sensor nodes within communication
range can directly communicate with each other. We calcu-
late the resiliency of the network with respect to two param-
eters of resiliency. Our scheme is resilient to selective node
capture attack and node fabrication attack.
Keywords: Combinatorial Design, Intersection Num-
ber, SBIBD.
1 Introduction
Sensor nodes are devices with very limited power and
memory and are deployed in large numbers over a tar-
get region. There are two types of sensor networks.
(i)Hierarchical Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN) and
(ii)Distributed Wireless Sensor Networks (DWSN). HWSN
consists of sensor nodes with different power and memory
and are deployed according to some predetermined pattern.
There are mainly three types of nodes according to descend-
ing capabilities. (i) Base stations (ii) Cluster heads (iii) Sen-
sor nodes. The DWSN contain sensor nodes which are ran-
domly deployed and continue to work unattended for large
periods of time. Sensor nodes can effectively communicate
with each other within a particular range called the Radio
Frequency (RF) range.
In applications where secure communication in needed
(for example in adversarial regions), sensors encrypt mes-
sages using cryptographic keys. The keys are either predis-
tributed in the sensor nodes or online key exchange proto-
cols can be used. Online key exchange is not very popular to
date as implementation of public key framework demands
processing power at the higher end. Very recently imple-
mentations of ECC and RSA on 8-bit CPUs have been pro-
posed [13]. Still a closer scrutiny of [12, Table 2, Section 3.
3] reveals that the algorithms execute in seconds (the range
being 0.43s to 83.26s); whereas the key predistribution just
involves the calculation of inverse of an integer modulo a
prime number [14], which is bound to be much faster than
the former. Hence key predistribution is an attractive op-
tion.
Key predistribution techniques can be randomized, de-
terministic or hybrid. In randomized technique of key pre-
distribution [11, 7], keys are drawn randomly from a key
pool and placed in each sensor node. This technique does
not guarantee that any two nodes will be able to communi-
cate directly. If direct communication is not possible, then
a path needs to be established between the two nodes. This
makes communication slower and power consuming.
In deterministic key predistribution, keys are placed in
sensor nodes in a predetermined manner. The pioneering
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work of Camtepe and Yener [3, 4] used projective planes
and generalized quadrangles, Lee and Stinson [14, 15] used
transversal designs, Chakrabarty, Maitra and Roy [5, 6]
used merging blocks constructed from transversal designs.
Other works include the use of PBIBD by Ruj and
Roy [18], modified transversal designs by Ruj and Roy [17],
3− designs by Dong, Pei and Wang [9] and Costas arrays
and Distinct Difference Configuration (DDC) by Black-
burn, Etzion, Martin and Paterson [1, 2] and orthogonal
arrays [10]. Hybrid designs combine the above two ap-
proaches and have been studied in [3, 4, 5].
Here we consider a deterministic key predistribution
scheme based on combinatorial designs. It has the advan-
tage that it can support a network of very large size, at the
cost of very few keys in each node. Also by suitably choos-
ing the parameters of the design, it can be ensured that every
pair of nodes within communication range can communi-
cate directly, thus making communication efficient and less
error-prone. The main advantage of our scheme is that it is
resilient to selective node capture attack and node fabrica-
tion attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we define a few terms and concepts. We also define
the threat model. We present our predistribution scheme in
Section 3.
We study the effect of node compromise on such a net-
work in Section 4. We conclude with some open problems
in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Combinatorial designs
Definition 1 A set system or design [14] is a pair (X, A),
where A is a set of subsets of X , called blocks. The
elements of X are called varieties. A Balanced Incom-
plete Block Design (BIBD) BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ), is a design
which satisfy the following conditions:
1. |X| = v, |A| = b,
2. Each subset in A contains exactly k elements,
3. Each variety in X occurs in r many blocks,
4. Each pair of varieties in X is contained in exactly λ
blocks in A.
A BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ) design can be represented by a
incidence matrix M = [mij ] of dimension v×b with entries
0 and 1. mij = 1, if the ith variety is present in the jth block
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2 Suppose that (X, A) is a set system, where
X = {xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ v}
and
A = {Aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ b}.
The dual set system of (X, A) is any set isomorphic to the
set system (X ′, A′) where
X ′ = {x′j : 1 ≤ j ≤ b},
A′ = {A′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ v},
and where
x′j ∈ A′i ⇐⇒ xi ∈ Aj .
It follows that if we take the dual of a
BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ), we arrive at a design containing
b varieties, v blocks each block containing exactly r
varieties and each variety occurring in exactly k blocks.
We also note that any two blocks contain λ elements in
common.
Definition 3 When v = b, the BIBD is called a symmetric
BIBD or SBIBD and denoted by SB[v, k;λ].
Definition 4 A pairwise balanced design (PBD) is a design
in which each pair of points occurs in λ blocks, for some
constant λ, called the index of the design.
Definition 5 The intersection number between any two
blocks is the number of elements common to the blocks.
Definition 6 Let the intersection numbers between any the
blocks in a BIBD be µ1, µ2, · · · , µx. Let M = {µi : i =
1, 2, · · · , x}. Let µ = max{µ1, µ2, · · · , µx}. µ is called
the linkage of the design.
We note that for a SBIBD, |M | = 1 and µ = λ.
2.2 Threat Model
There are different types of models for node capture [16].
1. Random node capture attack: Nodes are captured
randomly.
2. Selective node capture attack: This capture attack is
given in [16]. Assume that the attacker’s goal is to
collect a subset T of the keys in the pool. The attacker
has already compromised a number of sensors, and has
collected all their keys in a set W . For every sensor s
in the WSN, the key information gain G(s) is a ran-
dom variable equal to the number of keys in the key
ring of s which are in T and are not in W . For exam-
ple, if the attacker’s goal is to compromise the channel
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between sensors sa and sb, subset T in the above def-
inition is equal to Ma
⋂
Mb, (where Ma and Mb are
the keys in the key chains of sa and sb respectively)
that is it contains all the keys which are in the key-
ring of both sa and sb . Assuming that the attacker
has collected a set W of keys, random variable G(s)
is equal to |(Ms
⋂
Ma
⋂
Mb)\W |. At each step of the
attack sequence, the next sensor to be tampered with
is sensor s, where s maximizes E[G(s)|I(s)], the ex-
pectation of the key information gain G(s) given the
information I(s) that the attacker knows on sensor s
key ring.
3. Node Fabrication Attack: In the node fabrication at-
tack, the attacker compromises only a few sensors and
uses the captured keys to fabricate sensors with iden-
tities of uncompromised sensors or fabricate sensors
with new identities. Then, the attacker can deploy the
fabricated nodes in the parts of the network where the
original node is not present. The uncompromised sen-
sors in the network cannot detect the fabricated nodes
as anomalous nodes as long as they can have standard
communication with them. This attack is more severe
as compared to passive listening attacks as the attacker
may have enough information to fabricate many sen-
sors with many different identities and possibly out-
number the original set of sensors.
In this paper we show that an attacker does not gain in any
way by launching a selective node capture attack. In fact
selective node capture is just as good as random node cap-
ture from the point of view of the attacker. We show that
our scheme is resilient to node fabrication attack.
3 Design construction
We can map a BIBD(v, b, r, k, λ) design to a sensor
network containing v keys in the key-pool. There are b sen-
sor nodes, each node containing k keys are each key occur-
ring in r nodes. Any pair of keys occur in λ blocks.
It can be seen that for a symmetric design any pair two
blocks will contain λ elements in common, since µ = λ.
We consider two BIBDs: D1 = (v1, b1, r1, k1, λ1) and
D2 = (v2, b2, r2, k2, λ2). Let M1 = [m′ij ] and M2 = [m
′′
ij ]
be the respective incidence matrices. Therefore the dimen-
sion of M1 and M2 are v1 × b1 and v2 × b2 respectively. A
requirement for our design is that k1 = v2. This facilitates
in the construction of the new matrix from the older ones.
We construct the matrix M in the following way.
1. For every column j of M1 replace m′ij by a row of M2,
if m′ij = 1. For each i replace m
′ij by a different row
of M2.
2. For every column j of M1 replace m′ij by a row vector
of length b2 containing all zeros, if m′ij = 0.
The result of the following operations is a matrix M of di-
mension v1 × b1b2. We call the design D and represent D
by D = D1 ./ D2. We say that D is the expanded design
of D1 and D2. The blocks in D which arise from a given
block in D1 are said to belong to the same group.
Now we map this design D to a sensor network consist-
ing of b1b2 nodes, each node consisting of k2 keys. The
key-pool consists of v1 keys.
3.1 Analysis of the linked design
We note that the number of sensor nodes can be in-
creased without increasing the size of the key-pool and the
number of keys in each node. This is very important since a
DWSN contains a large number of nodes with very limited
memory and power. Both these problems can be effectively
handled by our design.
Now we have to ensure that no two nodes will have the
same set of keys in them. The following example results in
two nodes having the same set of keys.
Example 1 Consider the designs D1 = (8, 14, 7, 4, 3) and
D2 = (4, 4, 3, 3, 2) [8]. Then we arrive at the matrices
which are given below.
D1 =
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
and D2 =
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
.
For columns say 1 and 2 of D1, we get two identical
columns in in D1 ./ D2 as
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
and
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
.
.
So we see that two blocks (corresponding to columns 1 and
5 in D1 ./ D2) will be identical.
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The following theorem imposes some restriction on the
choices of the parameters of the design so that no two blocks
are identical.
Theorem 1 Let D1 = (v1, b1, r1, k1, λ1) and D2 =
(v2, b2, r2, k2, λ2) be two BIBDs. Let µ1, µ2, · · · , µt
be the intersection numbers of any two blocks in D1. Let
µ = max{µi : i = 1, 2, · · · , t}. If µ < k2 then, no two
blocks will have the same set of keys in them.
Proof : Refer to the construction in Section 3. By our
construction each column gives rise to b2 columns. The b2
blocks corresponding to these columns which belong to the
same group will be different since the blocks in D2 are dif-
ferent. So we consider blocks which arise out of two dif-
ferent columns of D1. Let B1 and B2 be two blocks in D1
which share µ elements in common. So the matrix M1 will
have µ rows where both the columns B1 and B2 will have
ones in them. Let these rows be n1, n2, · · · , nµ. When we
construct the matrix M , for each of these k1 ones of col-
umn B1 and B2 we substitute a row of M2. Let for the µ
rows n1, n2, · · · , nµ we have ones in the same rows in two
columns C1 arising from B1 and column C2 arising from
B2 of the matrix M . Since µ < k2 there are some other
rows in the block B1 which will give a 1 in column C1 but
not in C2. Similarly, there are some other rows in the block
B2 which will give a 1 in column C2 but not in C1. Hence
the two nodes arising from C1 and C2 can never have the
same keys. This happens for every pair of columns in the
resulting matrix M . Hence none of the blocks in M have
the same elements.
Additionally we would like to ensure that any two blocks
share at least one key. We give a construction which will al-
ways ensure that any two blocks will share at least one key.
Let D1 = (v1, b1, r1, k1, λ1) such that two blocks share µ1,
µ2, · · · , µi varieties in common. Let µ = min{µi : i =
1, 2, · · · , t} ≥ 3. Let D2 = (v2 = k1, b2 = k1, r2 =
k1− 1, k2 = k1− 1, λ2 = k1− 2). Then it can be seen that
any two blocks will have at least one element in common.
Example 2 Consider the two designs D1 =
(63, 63, 31, 31, 15) and
D2 = (31, 31, 30, 30, 29), then the sensor network will
have 1953 sensors each sensor having just 30 keys and the
size of the key-pool will be 63 and each pair of nodes can
communicate directly with each other.
Example 3 Consider the two designs D1 =
(255, 255, 127, 127, 63) and
D2 = (127, 127, 126, 126, 125), then the sensor network
will have 32385 sensors each sensor having just 126 keys
which is much less than the square root of the number of
nodes. The size of the key-pool will be 255 and each pair of
nodes shares more than one keys.
The above example are just a few instances to show how
we can increase the number of sensor nodes, without adding
more keys in the nodes and communicate directly with ev-
ery node thus saving power and minimizing errors caused
due to multiple hops.
We next study the effect of node compromise. We define
two parameters for resiliency and and show that our scheme
fares better than that of [14] in several respects.
4 Effect of node compromise
Sensor nodes deployed in an hostile region are prone to
node capture or compromise. In such a situation all the keys
in the compromised nodes become ineffective and cannot be
used for further communication. Hence we need to know
how resilient the network is under node compromise. This
means that on compromising some nodes only a part of the
network will be affected. When nodes are compromised, it
may so happen that either some links are broken or a whole
node is disconnected. The later happens when all the keys
in the node are exposed. We measure the resiliency of a net-
work in terms of two parameters V (s), which is the fraction
of nodes disconnected when s nodes are compromised and
E(s), which is the fraction of links broken when s nodes
are compromised.
We have already seen that there can be three types of
attack on the sensor nodes.
4.1 Resiliency against selective node cap-
ture
During selective node capture attack, the attacker com-
promises those nodes whose keys have not already been
compromised. We note that any two nodes broadcast only
their node identifiers during the shared-key discovery phase.
The key identifiers are not broadcasted. At no stage the
attacker can know what key identifier is present in which
node. Hence there is no way of knowing which nodes are
left to be compromised. Thus unless the attacker compro-
mises the node, she cannot choose a node for compromise to
maximize the number of keys compromised. Hence the at-
tacker does not gain anything by mounting a selective node
capture.
4.2 Resiliency against node fabrication at-
tack
In node fabrication attack, the attacker compromises a
few sensors and fabricates new nodes with new identities
or with identities of the uncompromised sensors. In our
scheme each node has a distinct identifier and hence it is
not possible to assign the same identifier to another node.
Also since the nodes know which identifiers are valid, new
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N Size of No of keys s V (s)
Key-pool per node
528 66 23 6 0.1667
1596 288 27 8 0.0681
1840 184 39 7 0.12711
2840 355 39 8 0.08264
2840 355 39 10 0.09641
Table 1. Experimental value of V (s) for 100
runs, when number of nodes is N and s
nodes are compromised.
identifiers cannot be assigned. Hence our scheme is secure
against node fabrication attack.
4.3 Resiliency against random node com-
promise
Study of V (s):
V (s) is defined as the fraction of nodes disconnected
when s nodes are compromised. Mathematically,
V (s) =
Number of nodes disconnected when s nodes are compromised
N−s ,
where N is the size of the network.
We calculate the minimum number of nodes that must
be compromised to disconnect one node. To disconnect one
node all the k2 keys in the node must be compromised. We
note that if nodes within the same group are compromised,
maximum nodes are affected. This is because, two nodes
within the same group intersect at more number of points
that two nodes in distinct blocks. When the parameters are
(v2, v2, v2 − 1, v2 − 1, v2 − 2), then any two nodes within
the same group share v2 − 2 keys. Thus if two nodes are
compromised within the same block, then one node is dis-
connected. This node lies in the same block as the compro-
mised nodes.
However if nodes belong to different blocks then more
number of nodes have to be compromised to disconnect one
node.
The Table 1 gives the experimental result of V (s) when
s nodes are compromised.
Study of E(s)
To break the entire network, the minimum number
of nodes that have to be compromised is v1/k2. This is
because to break the entire system all keys v1 have to
be exposed. Suppose each sensor contributes k2 keys.
Given s nodes are compromised (s < v1/k2), number
of keys lost is less than sk2. Number of links broken is
total number of links ∗ sk2/v1. Hence maximum value of
E(s) is given by sk2/v1. E(s) denotes the fraction of links
broken when s nodes are compromised. Mathematically,
E(s) =
Number of links broken when s nodes are compromised
(N−s)(N−s−1)/2 ,
where s is the number of nodes compromised. The Table 2
represent the experimental values of E(s).
N Size of No of keys s E(s)
Key-pool per node
528 66 23 7 0.4712
1596 288 27 8 0.3807
1840 184 39 7 0.3485
2840 355 39 8 0.2547
2840 355 39 10 0.3443
Table 2. Experimental value of E(s) for 100
runs, when number of nodes is N and s
nodes are compromised.
4.4 Comparative study
We compare our design with that given in [14] and see
that our design performs much better in several respects.
Firstly even for a very large network the number of keys per
node is very small. If N be the size of the network, then
each node contains less than
√
N keys. Secondly we can
ensure that every pair of nodes within communication range
is directly connected. This minimizes the cost, the time
and the error in communication. The design given in [14]
did not ensure that any two nodes were directly connected.
Thirdly we see that our design has better resiliency (E(s))
as observed in Figure 1 below. We compare the following
two schemes. We choose approximately the same parame-
ters which are given in Lee and Stinson’s [14] scheme.
1. Our scheme having a network of size 2840 where each
node has 39 keys per node and the size of the key-pool
is 355.
2. The scheme given in [14] having a network of size
2209 where each node has 30 keys and the size of the
key-pool is 1740.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we describe a key predistribution scheme
using combinatorial designs. Our scheme can support a
very large network still maintaining very few keys in each
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node. By properly choosing the parameters it can be en-
sured that any two nodes within communication range can
communicate directly. Our scheme is also resilient to selec-
tive node capture attack and node fabrication attack.
In future we would like to study the properties of ex-
panded design and chose the combinatorial designs which
give best resiliency.
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